USA v. Weaver by unknown
2001 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-21-2001 
USA v. Weaver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Weaver" (2001). 2001 Decisions. 214. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2001/214 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2001 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed September 21, 2001 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 00-2203 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RUDOLPH WEAVER, 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 99-cr-00002E) 
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
 
Argued March 15, 2001 
 
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and BRIGHT,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 21, 2001) 
 
       Thomas W. Patton, Esq. [ARGUED] 
       Office of Federal Public Defender 
       1001 State Street 
       1111 Renaissance Centre 
       Erie, PA 16501 
Counsel for Appellant 
Rudolph Weaver 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esq. [ARGUED] 
       Office of United States Attorney 
       633 United States Post Office 
        & Courthouse 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
       Counsel for Appellee 
       United States of America 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Rudolph Weaver appeals his armed robbery conviction on 
the grounds that the jury pool in the Erie Division of the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, from which the jury that 
convicted him was chosen, did not reflect a fair cross 
section of the community as required by the Sixth 
Amendment and the Jury Service and Selection Act. Weaver 
also challenges other rulings of the District Court based on 
the Jencks Act and procedures he claims are required in 
order to sentence him under the "Three Strikes" statute, 18 
U.S.C. S 3559 (c)(1). The District Court found no violation of 
Weaver's constitutional or statutory rights. We will affirm. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
On December 21, 1998, Weaver entered the First 
National Bank in Erie, Pennsylvania, waving a gun and 
demanding the cash in the tellers' drawers. He threatened 
to shoot the tellers if they did not comply with his orders. 
The tellers emptied the contents of their drawers into 
shopping bags, and Weaver left with approximately 
$20,000. Later that day, bank surveillance photographs 
taken during the robbery were shown on news programs, 
and a former classmate of Weaver's, Mary Giulianelli, 
communicated with the F.B.I. immediately after the evening 
news to identify Weaver as the man shown in the photos. 
App. at 767-68. The following day, Agent Van Slyke showed 
a photo array to Rosalie Landon, one of the three tellers on 
duty that day. Coincidentally, Landon had helped Weaver 
open an account at the bank several months before the 
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robbery. She identified Weaver as the robber. App. at 502- 
03. 
 
In January 1999, a grand jury returned a two-count 
indictment charging Weaver with bank robbery in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a) and use of a dangerous weapon in 
connection with a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
2113(d). Weaver was arrested on March 25, 1999. On 
February 10, 2000, as required by 18 U.S.C. S 851(a), the 
government filed notice of its intent to seek a mandatory life 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3559(c). The case 
proceeded to trial on March 21, 2000. The evidence was 
overwhelming: Weaver's girlfriend, Ethel Mae Wheat, 
testified that Weaver told her that he had robbed the bank 
and showed her a briefcase containing several thousand 
dollars. App. at 720. In addition, Wheat's son testified that 
he owned a gun similar to the one in the photographs, 
which had been missing since the time of the bank robbery. 
App. at 634-35. They also identified certain clothing 
belonging to Weaver, which was the clothing identified by 
witnesses as having been worn by the robber. App. at 639- 
41, 732-34. In addition, three of Weaver's acquaintances 
testified that they believed the man in the surveillance 
photographs to be Weaver. On March 24, 2000, a jury 
found Weaver guilty on both counts. In an amended 
judgment of sentence entered on July 24, 2000, the District 
Court sentenced Weaver to life in prison and ordered him 
to pay restitution in the amount of $31,051.30. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Weaver's criminal 
prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. S 3742. We review the District Court's findings of 
fact for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. United 
States v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2000). Whether 
a defendant has been denied his or her right to a jury 
selected from a fair cross section of the community is a 
mixed question of law and fact, and is reviewed de novo. 
United States v. Allen, 160 F.3d 1096, 1101 (6th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1985); 
see also United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 1077 
(11th Cir. 1995) (holding that constitutional challenges to 
jury selection process are reviewed de novo). 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Challenge to Fair Representation in the Jury Pool 
 
Weaver challenges his conviction on the grounds that he 
was denied his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross 
section of the community as required by the Sixth 
Amendment's fair cross section provision1  and the Jury 
Selection and Service Act of 1968, which codifies the Sixth 
Amendment right. He argues that the pool from which his 
jury was selected underrepresented African-Americans and 
Hispanics due to its exclusive reliance on voter registration 
lists. 
 
"[T]he American concept of the jury trial contemplates a 
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. . . . 
[I]t is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as 
instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly 
representative of the community." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
This requirement of a fair cross section is not without 
substantial limits -- it does not guarantee that juries be "of 
any particular composition." Id. at 538. All that is required 
is that "the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires 
from which juries are drawn must not systematically 
exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail 
to be reasonably representative thereof." Id.  (emphasis 
added). The objectives of the fair cross section requirement 
include avoiding "the possibility that the composition of the 
juries would be arbitrarily skewed in such a way as to deny 
criminal defendants the benefit of the common-sense 
judgment of the community" and avoiding the "appearance 
of unfairness" that would result from excluding"large 
groups of individuals, not on the basis of their ability to 
serve as jurors, but on the basis of some immutable 
characteristic such as race, gender or ethnic background." 
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . . trial[ ] by an impartial jury 
of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
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The Jury Selection and Service Act ("The Act") provides as 
follows: 
 
       [A]ll litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury 
       shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected 
       at random from a fair cross section of the community 
       in the district or division wherein the court convenes. 
       It is further the policy of the United States that all 
       citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for 
       service on grand and petit juries in the district courts 
       of the United States, and shall have an obligation to 
       serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1861 (West 2001). The Act "seeks to ensure 
that potential grand and petit jurors are selected at random 
from a representative cross section of the community and 
that all qualified citizens have the opportunity to be 
considered for service." United States v. Calabrese, 942 
F.2d 218, 220 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Claims under the Act are analyzed using the same 
standard as a Sixth Amendment fair cross section claim. 
See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584-85 (10th Cir. 
1976) (en banc) (Act's fair cross section standard is 
"functional equivalent of the constitutional`reasonably 
representative' standard"). 
 
When enacted, the Act required "[e]ach United States 
district court [to] devise and place into operation a written 
plan for random selection of . . . petit jurors that[would] be 
designed to achieve the [above-mentioned] objectives of 
sections 1861 and 1862." 28 U.S.C. S 1863(a) (West 2001). 
Congress determined that the principal source of names for 
the random selection should be either "the voter 
registration lists or the lists of actual voters." Id. at 
S 1863(b)(2). The Act also provided: "The plan shall 
prescribe some other source or sources of names in 
addition to voter lists where necessary to foster the policy 
and protect the rights secured by sections 1861 and 1862 
. . . ." Id. 
 
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair 
cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and the 
Act, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) the group alleged 
to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) 
 
                                5 
  
the representation of this group in jury venires is not "fair 
and reasonable" in relation to the number of such persons 
in the community; and (3) the underrepresentation is 
caused by the "systematic exclusion of the group in the jury 
selection process." Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 
(1979). A defendant need not show discriminatory intent. 
See id. at 368 n. 26 ("In contrast [to an Equal Protection 
claim], in Sixth Amendment fair cross-section cases, 
systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an 
infringement of the defendant's interest in a jury chosen 
from a fair community cross section.") And, "once a 
defendant has made a prima facie showing of an 
infringement of his constitutional right to a jury drawn a 
fair cross section of the community, it is the State that 
bears the burden of justifying this infringement by showing 
attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a 
significant state interest." Id. at 368. 
 
The plan approved by the Western District of 
Pennsylvania at the time of the jury selection in Weaver's 
case, and currently in effect, employs voter registration lists 
as the exclusive source from which it summons potential 
jurors for service. App. at 77. Juror names are drawn at 
random from the voter registration lists of the seven 
counties in the Erie Division and placed into a master jury 
wheel ("master wheel").2Id. At periodic intervals, the Clerk 
publicly draws names at random from the master wheel. All 
those selected are sent jury questionnaires. Id.  All those 
who return questionnaires and are not disqualified, exempt 
or excused, are placed in a separate wheel called the 
"qualified wheel." App. at 87. 
 
To prove his claim that the venire underrepresented 
African-Americans and Hispanics in violation of his 
constitutional and statutory rights, Weaver introduced the 
testimony of Dr. Andrew A. Beveridge, who was recognized 
as an expert in demography. Beveridge compared the 
number of African-Americans and Hispanics in the adult 
population of seven counties comprising the Erie Division 
to the number of African-Americans and Hispanics 
represented in the master wheels used in the Erie Division 
since 1995. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The master wheel is emptied and refilled every two years. App. at 83. 
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The District Court found the statistical evidence offered 
for the years prior to 1999 to be too "weak" to "establish 
unfair and unreasonable representation" because the 
findings were based on random samples that the District 
Court found to be inadequate (500 persons for 1995 and 
1997). App. at 16. The District Court based this 
determination in part on Beveridge's concession that a 
sample size of only 500 "weakens the power of the 
estimate," and also on his admission that he could not 
conclude within a reasonable degree of mathematical 
certainty that there was underrepresentation during either 
of those years without looking at the entire pattern.3 App. 
at 251-52. In examining the 1999 evidence, the District 
Court noted, as testified to by Beveridge and argued by 
Weaver, that in contrast to 1995 and 1997, Beveridge was 
able to obtain "a complete statistical breakdown" of the 
1999 "master wheel." App. at 15, 99, Appellant Br. at 29. 
 
Beveridge determined that while census figures indicate 
that 3.07% of the voting population in Erie is African- 
American, African-Americans comprised only 1.84% of the 
1999 master wheel. He also stated that Hispanics 
comprised .97% of the population, but only .26% of the 
wheel.4 The absolute disparity, which is calculated by 
subtracting the percentage of the group on the wheel from 
the percentage of the group in the relevant population, 
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992) (en 
banc), is thus 1.23% for African-Americans, and .71% for 
Hispanics. Using a comparative disparity analysis, 5 which is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Weaver does not challenge this finding on appeal, choosing instead to 
focus on the evidence Beveridge presented regarding all returned 
questionnaires from 1999. 
4. This chart represents the statistics before us: 
 
1999 Wheel     Percentage in   Percentage in    Absolute   Comparative 
               Population      Wheel            Disparity  Disparity 
 
African-       3.07            1.84             1.23       40.01 
Americans 
 
Hispanics       .97             .26              .71       72.98  
      
5. An example of comparative disparity is as follows: in a master wheel 
of 1000, where a group comprises 50% of the population, yet only makes 
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calculated by dividing the absolute disparity by the 
percentage of the population that a particular group 
comprises, id. at 1231, the disparity for African-Americans 
was 40.01%, while it was 72.98% for Hispanics. This figure 
"measures the diminished likelihood that members of an 
underrepresented group, when compared to the population 
as a whole, will be called for jury service." Id. at 1231-32. 
 
Beveridge did not perform an additional calculation 
normally used in fair cross section claims. Known as 
"standard deviation" analysis, this calculation is only 
utilized where the expert has performed an analysis based 
on a random sample from the voter wheel.6  Here, Beveridge 
claimed to be analyzing the entire wheel instead of taking 
a sample.7 Therefore, he stated that there was no standard 
deviation calculation. However, Beveridge did perform a 
"binomial distribution analysis," which measures the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
up 25% of the wheel, the comparative disparity is 50%, because half of 
that group is being excluded. That is, there should be 500 of that group 
on the wheel, but there are only 250. Hence, there is 50% 
underrepresentation within the group itself. 
 
6. Beveridge elucidated the concept by offering the following example: in 
a survey of 800 persons, where the results indicate that 46% of people 
would vote for Candidate A, and 46% for Candidate B, with a margin of 
error of 3%, the margin of error establishes the degree of confidence that 
the figures presented represent the entire voting population, even though 
the survey is based on a sample of only 800 persons. Beveridge stated 
that standard deviation is like a margin of error, because it establishes 
the probability that a sample taken from the jury wheel accurately 
reflects the composition of the entire wheel. App. at 218. 
 
7. As we will address in our discussion of Weaver's statistical 
presentation, despite his testimony, Beveridge did not actually analyze 
the entire master wheel. He testified that he was able to determine the 
race of nearly every juror on the master wheel based on those jurors 
indicating their race on the questionnaires sent to them. The master 
wheel consists of jurors chosen at random from the voter registration 
rolls, before any questionnaires have been mailed yet. But Beveridge 
actually examined, and testified based on, the returned questionnaires. 
For the 1999 wheel, 5,877 questionnaires were mailed. App. at 125. Yet 
only 4,753 of those were completed and returned. Id. Beveridge did not 
attempt to account for those not returned, yet consistently testified that 
he had examined the entire composition of the master wheel. 
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likelihood that the underrepresentation of African- 
Americans and Hispanics would occur by random chance. 
Beveridge stated that the likelihood for African-Americans 
was one in 6,603,384 and for Hispanics, one in 
130,337,015. 
 
The District Court first stated that it believed that under 
our existing precedent, Weaver's claim would fail on the 
first prong of the prima facie case because African- 
Americans and Hispanics who do not vote are not 
cognizable groups. The Court then found that, even 
assuming that the first prong had been satisfied, Weaver's 
claim still failed on the basis of the second and third 
prongs. It held that Weaver's statistical presentation was 
too limited, and that using voter registration lists to 
generate the venire did not amount to systematic exclusion. 
We will address each of the three prongs of the prima facie 
case identified in Duren, all of which Weaver must satisfy in 
order to make out a fair cross section claim. 
 
1. First Prong -- Cognizable group 
 
The District Court here framed the issue in the same way 
we did in United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 
1973), decided before the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Duren. Lewis involved a challenge to the venire selection 
process based on its alleged underrepresentation of African- 
Americans. Without the guidance of Duren regarding the 
prima facie claim, it appears we missed the mark as to 
what a plaintiff must show in order to demonstrate that a 
cognizable group was underrepresented. In Lewis , we held 
that to successfully make out a fair cross section claim, 
"the defendant must establish that Blacks . . . . choosing 
not to register to vote were a cognizable group which were 
systematically excluded." Id. at 256. 
 
We agree with Weaver that Lewis has been overruled by 
Duren at least insofar as its view of the first prong is 
concerned. While it is true that persons who do not vote are 
not a cognizable group, e.g., United States v. Afflerbach, 
754 F.2d 866, 869 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Persons who choose 
not to register to vote do not comprise . . . a cognizable 
group."), this is not the relevant inquiry. Rather, when a 
specific population such as African-Americans or Hispanics 
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is claimed to be underrepresented by the voter rolls, the 
relevant inquiry is simply whether African-Americans and 
Hispanics are cognizable groups. 
 
This is made clear by Duren, in which the defendant 
challenged the underrepresentation of women, where 
Missouri had a procedure that gave women the option of 
exempting themselves from jury service. 439 U.S. at 360. 
The Supreme Court noted the proper approach to the first 
prong: 
 
       With respect to the first part of the prima facie test, 
       Taylor v. Louisiana, without a doubt, established that 
       women are sufficiently numerous and distinct from 
       men so that if they are systematically eliminated from 
       jury panels, the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section 
       requirement cannot be satisfied. 
 
Id. at 364. Thus, we now evaluate the first prong of the 
Duren fair cross section test by making the following 
inquiry: Is the allegedly underrepresented group sufficiently 
numerous and distinct from others in the population that 
if members of the group are systematically eliminated, the 
defendant's right to a jury composed of a fair cross section 
of the community would be violated?8 
 
Applying this analysis to the instant case, Weaver's claim 
satisfies the first prong of the Duren test: African-Americans 
and Hispanics are "distinctive" groups for the purposes of 
a fair cross-section analysis. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482, 495 (1977) ("[I]t is no longer open to dispute that 
Mexican-Americans are a clearly identifiable class."); 
Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1230 ("African-Americans are 
unquestionably a constitutionally cognizable group."); see 
also United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Furthermore, if we were to adhere to Lewis 's theory of the relevant 
cognizable group, then Duren's second prong, which was not discussed 
in Lewis, could not be meaningfully applied. As we will discuss, the 
second prong requires a comparison between the representation of the 
group in jury venires and the number of such persons in the community. 
439 U.S. at 364. Were we to define the relevant group as all African- 
Americans not registered to vote, as the District Court did, the 
representation of the group in the jury venire -- and, thus, the 
numerator in the calculation -- would always be zero. 
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("There is no dispute that . . . Blacks are unquestionably a 
"distinctive" group for the purposes of a fair cross-section 
analysis."); United States v. Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1246 
(2d Cir. 1995) ("There is little question that both Blacks and 
Hispanics are "distinctive" groups in the community for 
purposes of this test."). Thus, we disagree with the District 
Court's analysis of the first prong of the Duren  prima facie 
case. 
 
2. Second Prong -- "Fair and reasonable" 
       representation 
 
The second prong of Duren asks whether the 
representation of the group in the jury venires is fair and 
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community. 439 U.S. at 364. This is, at least in part, a 
mathematical exercise, and must be supported by 
statistical evidence. Id. "Initially, the defendant must 
demonstrate the percentage of the community made up of 
the group alleged to be underrepresented, for this is the 
conceptual benchmark for the Sixth Amendment fair-cross- 
section requirement." Id. Here, Census figures indicate that 
3.07% of the voting population in the seven counties 
comprising the Erie Division is African-American and.97% 
is Hispanic. This data has not been challenged; hence, we 
will proceed on the assumption that these figures are 
correct. 
 
In Ramseur, we considered a challenge to the jury 
selection process in Essex County, New Jersey, which used 
both voter registration and Department of Motor Vehicle 
lists as the source of its master wheel. 983 F.2d at 1230. 
Ramseur argued that African-Americans were being 
excluded in violation of both the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment9 and the fair cross section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. No equal protection challenge is made here. It requires a different 
showing: 
 
       The first step is to establish that the group [alleged to be 
       underrepresented] is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, 
       singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or 
as 
       applied. Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by 
       comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to 
the 
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provision of the Sixth Amendment. We found that while the 
first prong of each test was met, Ramseur's two year-long 
study establishing 14.1% absolute disparity and 40% 
comparative disparity presented "insufficient" figures to 
meet either the Equal Protection or Sixth Amendment 
standards set forth in Castaneda and Duren, respectively. 
983 F.2d at 1233-35. We denied both claims, id.  at 1235, 
focusing the majority of our analysis on Ramseur's Equal 
Protection challenge, id. at 1229-34. 
 
In our brief discussion of Ramseur's Sixth Amendment 
claim, we appear to have combined the second and the 
third prongs of Duren, and stated, generally, that our 
inquiry involved an examination of "the nature of the 
process by which jury lists are composed, the length of time 
of underrepresentation, and the strength of the evidence 
that purports to establish an `unfair and unreasonable' 
representation under Duren." Id. at 1235. We determined 
that, looking at these factors, Ramseur had not made out 
a prima facie case under the Sixth Amendment. Id. 
Ramseur presented two years of inconclusive statistical 
data and the county process was shown to be facially 
neutral and part of an ongoing process in New Jersey to 
increase the representative nature of jury lists. Id. Though 
we considered these two prongs in tandem in Ramseur, 
here we will evaluate them separately. Following Duren's 
approach, the strength of the evidence should be 
considered under the second prong, while the nature of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant 
period 
       of time. This method of proof, sometimes called the"rule of 
       exclusion," has been held to be available as a method of proving 
       discrimination in jury selection against a delineated class. 
Finally, 
       as noted above, a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse 
or 
       is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination 
       raised by the statistical showing. Once the defendant has shown 
       substantial underrepresentation of his group, he has made out a 
       prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then 
       shifts to the State to rebut that case. 
 
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494-95 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
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process and the length of time of underrepresentation 
should be considered under the third.10  
 
Looking at the strength of the evidence supporting the 
second prong, we will examine the percentages of the two 
populations represented on the master wheel. The 
government does not challenge Weaver's data indicating 
that African-Americans and Hispanics comprised 1.84% 
and .97%, respectively, of the 1999 master wheel. However, 
the parties do dispute which method of statistical analysis 
should be used to determine the significance of the 
disparity between the percentages on the master wheel and 
the percentages in the voting population. 
 
Weaver urges that we should analyze the figures using 
comparative disparity, so that the figures of 40.01% for 
African-Americans and 72.98% for Hispanics would form 
the basis for this prong. In contrast, the government argues 
that we should do as the District Court did, and determine 
whether this second prong has been fulfilled by examining 
whether the absolute disparity figures of 1.23% for African- 
Americans and .71% for Hispanics, establish the requisite 
underrepresentation. Our precedent does not dictate that 
one method of statistical analysis should be used rather 
than another,11 and, in fact, both methods have been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In Duren, the Supreme Court decided the second prong based solely 
on statistical evidence: "The second prong of the prima facie case was 
established by petitioner's statistical presentation." 439 U.S. at 364. In 
its analysis of the third prong, the Court discussed the length of time of 
the study and the nature of the process as they related to whether the 
underrepresentation was inherent in the system itself: "[Duren's] 
undisputed demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just 
occasionally but in every weekly venire for a period of nearly a year 
manifestly indicates that the cause of the underrepresentation was 
systematic . . . ," id. at 366, and "Petitioner demonstrated that the 
underrepresentation of women in the final pool of prospective jurors was 
due to the operation of Missouri's exemption criteria . . . ," id. at 367. 
 
11. In Ramseur, we did not specify which type of statistical analysis is 
preferable in these type of cases: "Thus, both the absolute and 
comparative disparity analyses present results at the margin of the range 
found acceptable by the courts." 983 F.2d at 1232. Because we did note 
the results of both calculations, Ramseur supports our determination 
that we should consider both absolute and comparative disparity, 
instead of just choosing one over the other. 
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criticized. See, e.g., Thomas v. Borg, 159 F.3d 1147, 1150 
(9th Cir. 1998) (stating that "the comparative disparity test 
is strongly disfavored in the Ninth Circuit on the ground 
that it exaggerates the effect of any deviation."); United 
States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(pointing out that with absolute disparity, total exclusion of 
group comprising small percentage of population would 
result in figure appearing insignificant). 
 
The comparative disparity method has drawn a great deal 
of criticism in situations like the one before us, that is, 
where a small population is subjected to scrutiny. See 
Smith v. Yeager, 465 F.2d 272, 279 n.18 (3d Cir. 1972) 
("[T]he comparative [disparity] approach reaches absurd 
results . . . where the [African-American] population at the 
time was 4.4% of the total, and the [African-American] jury 
participation ranged as low as 2% of the jury list). Courts 
considering this analysis have said that while "these 
numbers may be more indicative of a Sixth Amendment 
violation, they . . . are distorted by the small population of 
the different minority groups." Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273. 
It has been argued that "a small variation in the figures 
used to calculate comparative disparity can produce a 
significant difference in the result, and . . . . there is reason 
to doubt the accuracy of the figures . . . ." United States v. 
Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States 
v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 548 (9th Cir. 1989) ("A 
comparative analysis is disfavored because it exaggerates 
the effect of any deviation."); United States v. Hafen, 726 
F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[T]he comparative disparity 
calculation might be a useful supplement to the absolute 
disparity calculation, . . . [but] the smaller the group is, the 
more the comparative disparity figure distorts the 
proportional representation."); United States v. Whitley, 491 
F.2d 1248, 1249 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that comparative 
disparity calculation "is ordinarily inappropriate" where a 
very small proportion of the population is involved and 
opining that it "distorts reality"). When comparative 
disparity has been used, it has been emphasized that the 
significance of the figure is directly proportional to the size 
of the group relative to the general population, and thus is 
most useful when dealing with a group that comprises a 
large percentage of the population. See, e.g. , LaRoche v. 
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Perrin, 718 F.2d 500, 502-03 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that 
prima facie violation established where comparative 
disparity was 68.22% and group comprised 68.4% of 
population), overruled on other grounds by Barber v. Ponte, 
772 F.2d 982, 996 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
 
Although absolute disparity, which was the method 
employed in Duren, seems to be the preferred method of 
analysis in most cases, see, e.g., Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1273 
("Absolute disparity . . . is the starting place for all other 
modes of comparison."), it also has its share of critics. 
Some courts have found that the absolute disparity 
calculation "understates the systematic representative 
deficiencies" in cases such as the one before us, where, 
unlike in Duren, the groups at issue comprise small 
percentages of the general population. Id.; see also id. 
(noting that "even the complete exclusion of the groups 
would result in absolute disparities of less than 6%"); 
Rogers, 73 F.3d at 777 ("[I]n this case, even if African- 
Americans [who comprised 1.87% of population] were 
excluded entirely from the lists of potential jurors, the 
maximum disparity, under an absolute calculation, would 
be 1.87%."). Because we think that figures from both 
methods inform the degree of underrepresentation, we will 
examine and consider the results of both in order to obtain 
the most accurate picture possible. 
 
Looking first at the comparative disparity figures, we find 
that they are quite high -- 40.01% and 72.98%-- but that 
because African-Americans and Hispanics comprise such a 
small percentage of the population, the results of this 
analysis are of questionable probative value.12 See United 
States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1257 (10th Cir. 
2000) (finding that where African-Americans accounted for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. When determining if "substantial underrepresentation" had been 
established as required to make out a prima facie claim under the Equal 
Protection clause, we stated in Ramseur that a 40% comparative 
disparity was only "borderline." 983 F.2d at 1232. Though an Equal 
Protection challenge differs from a fair cross section claim, the 
reasoning 
of Ramseur suggests that, with respect to the comparative disparity for 
African-Americans, 40.1% would not necessarily weigh in Weaver's favor, 
considering that the figure is comparable to Ramseur's "borderline" 
figure of 40%. 
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7.9% of population, and Hispanics, 2.74%, comparative 
disparities of 40.89% and 58.39%, respectively, did not 
establish prima facie violation); United States v. Clifford, 
640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that where 
Indians comprised 15.6% of population, 46% comparative 
disparity was insufficient underrepresentation to make out 
fair cross section claim). 
 
The absolute disparity figures are much lower -- 1.23% 
for African-Americans and .71% for Hispanics. These 
percentages are well below those that have previously been 
found insufficient to establish unfair and unreasonable 
representation.13 See Thomas , 159 F.3d at 1151 (finding 
that where African-Americans comprised 5.135% of 
population, and there were no African-Americans on jury 
panel, absolute disparity of approximately 5% was 
insufficient to make out fair cross section claim); Pion, 25 
F.3d at 23 (relying on absolute disparity figure of 3.4% in 
finding that underrepresentation was "relatively small" for 
Hispanics representing 4.2% of the general population); 
United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 
1982) (finding that where African-Americans comprised 
9.3% of population, Hispanics, 11.7% and Asians, 8.3%, 
absolute disparities of 2.8%, 7.7%, and 4.7%, respectively, 
were insubstantial); United States v. Armstrong , 621 F.2d 
951, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1980) (determining that absolute 
disparity of 2.83% for African-Americans comprising 4.2% 
of population was not sufficient). Accordingly, the results of 
this analysis fail to support this element of Weaver's prima 
facie case. 
 
Moreover, there is a fundamental weakness in the figures 
relied upon by Beveridge in his statistical presentation 
regarding the percentages on the "master wheel" -- a flaw 
that went unaddressed by both the parties and the District 
Court. As noted previously, despite his testimony, Beveridge 
did not actually analyze the entire 1999 master wheel. 
Instead, he examined and based his testimony on the 
returned questionnaires. For the 1999 wheel, 5,877 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Like with comparative disparity, Ramseur  found a 14.1% absolute 
disparity calculation in the Equal Protection context to be "borderline." 
983 F.2d at 1232. 
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questionnaires were mailed. App. at 125. Yet only 4,753 of 
those were completed and returned. Id. Beveridge did not 
attempt to account for those not returned, yet consistently 
testified that he had examined the entire composition of the 
master wheel. We find that this discrepancy in Beveridge's 
statistical presentation further undermines the strength of 
the evidence. In order to support Weaver's allegation of 
underrepresentation on the master wheel, Beveridge would 
have had to either analyze the races of all 5,877 jurors on 
the master wheel (as he claimed to have done), perform 
sampling of the master wheel14 and then calculate the 
standard deviation,15 or, alternatively, account for the 
statistical impact of the unreturned questionnaires. 
Weaver's statistical evidence is, therefore, far too weak to 
support a finding of representation that is unfair and 
unreasonable. 
 
3. Third Prong -- Systematic Exclusion 
 
While we need not reach the third prong, it merits our 
attention because the District Court placed some degree of 
reliance on this aspect. The third prong of Duren requires 
that the defendant show that the underrepresentation of 
the cognizable group is due to systematic exclusion in the 
jury selection process. 439 U.S. at 366. In Duren, the 
Supreme Court held that women were systematically 
excluded where the underrepresentation of women on jury 
lists resulted from their self-exclusion under a state law 
exemption privilege. Id. at 367. The Court stated that "[t]he 
resulting disproportionate and consistent exclusion of 
women from the jury wheel and at the venire stage was 
quite obviously due to the system by which juries were 
selected." Id. In Ramseur, we found no Sixth Amendment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Weaver did present studies based on samples of the 1995, 1997, and 
1999 wheels, but he did not base his appeal on this evidence, choosing 
instead to argue that the evidence based on the entire 1999 wheel was 
much more persuasive. Thus, we will not address Beveridge's studies 
based on samples from 1995, 1997 or 1999, restricting our focus to the 
statistical evidence based on all the returned questionnaires from 1999. 
 
15. As noted previously, Beveridge stated that standard deviation was 
unnecessary because he claimed to have done a complete statistical 
analysis of the 1999 master wheel. 
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violation where the jury selection process was neutral on its 
face and was being monitored, and modified, to try to 
enhance its representative character. 983 F.2d at 1235. 
 
Here, the government contends, and the District Court 
agreed, that where substantial representation is traceable 
solely to the exclusive reliance on voter registration lists, 
and the underrepresented group has freely excluded itself 
quite apart from the system itself, the third prong has not 
been fulfilled. The government emphasizes that Weaver has 
shown "no evidence of any interference with the 
opportunity . . . to vote." Appellant Br. at 27. In other 
words, there has been no showing of anything in the 
system that has discouraged or prevented a group from 
participating. 
 
We must be careful to note that intentional 
discrimination need not to be shown to prove a Sixth 
Amendment fair cross section claim. Duren, 439 U.S. at 
368 n. 26. Under Duren, "systematic exclusion" can be 
shown by a large discrepancy repeated over time such that 
the system must be said to bring about the 
underrepresentation: "[Here, petitioner's] undisputed 
demonstration that a large discrepancy occurred not just 
occasionally but in every weekly venire for a period of 
nearly a year manifestly indicates that the cause of the 
underrepresentation was systematic -- that is, inherent in 
the particular jury-selection process utilized." Id. at 366. 
Thus, while we need not determine the limits of"systematic 
exclusion" for our purposes, we note that if the use of voter 
registration lists over time did have the effect of sizeably 
underrepresenting a particular class or group on the jury 
venire, then under some circumstances, "this could 
constitute a violation of a defendant's `fair cross-section' 
rights under the [S]ixth [A]mendment." Bryant, 686 F.2d at 
1378 n.4; see also Barber, 772 F.2d at 989 ("A large 
discrepancy occurring over a sustained period of time 
where there is an opportunity for arbitrary selection is 
sufficient to demonstrate that the exclusion of the 
underrepresentation is systematic -- that is, inherent in the 
particular jury selection process utilized."). However, we see 
nothing in the record before us that is demonstrative of any 
such persistent "systematic exclusion" of Blacks and 
Hispanics. 
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Due to Weaver's failure to present sufficient evidence to 
satisfy the requirements of the prima facie case set forth in 
Duren, we will affirm the District Court's denial of Weaver's 
fair cross section challenge to Erie's jury selection process. 
 
B. Remaining Issues 
 
1. Failure to Grant a Mistrial Based on Non-Production 
       of Bank Teller's Written Descriptions 
 
Weaver also claims that the government violated the 
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3500. The Jencks Act requires that 
the government disclose prior recorded statements of its 
witnesses that are "related" to the subject matter of their 
testimony. Id. at S 3500(b); United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 
132, 139 (3d Cir. 1992). Such disclosures must be made 
after each witness testifies on direct examination. 976 F.2d 
at 139. 
 
At trial, several witnesses, including bank tellers, offered 
evidence as to Weaver's identity, and as we noted, one of 
the tellers, Ms. Landon, specifically recalled Weaver from 
his having opened an account at the bank five months 
before the robbery. Weaver contends that the Jencks Act 
was violated because, after direct examination of the 
various tellers, Weaver's counsel requested copies of written 
reports prepared by each of them describing the robber. 
The government was unable to produce any such reports. 
Therefore, Weaver urges that he was entitled to a mistrial. 
We review the District Court's denial of defendant's motion 
for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Id. 
 
It was conceded that it is bank policy for tellers to write 
a description of a robber immediately following the robbery. 
Indeed, shortly after the robbery, each of the three tellers 
did so and there was some evidence that they left them at 
the scene or gave them to some unidentified law 
enforcement officials who arrived on the scene. None of the 
tellers, however, could remember to whom they gave the 
descriptions and thus the District Court concluded that 
there was no evidence that the written descriptions were 
ever in the custody of federal law enforcement officials.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Although each teller testified on cross-examination that she wrote 
such a statement immediately after the robbery occurred, none of the 
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Because the Jencks Act only applies to evidence in the 
possession of the United States, and not state authorities, 
see 18 U.S.C. S 3500(b) ("in the possession of the United 
States"); United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 100 n.9 
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1266, 1269 
(5th Cir. 1970); Beavers v. United States, 351 F.2d 507, 
509 (9th Cir. 1965), we conclude there was no showing of 
a Jencks Act violation. 
 
2. Notice of Intent to Seek Life Imprisonment Under 
       the Provisions of Title 18 U.S. Code 3559 (c)(1) 
 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3559(c)(1)(A)(i),"a person who is 
convicted in a court of the United States of a serious violent 
felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if the person 
has been convicted . . . on separate prior occasions in a 
court of the United States or of a State of 2 or more serious 
violent felonies." Id. This is routinely referred to as the 
"Three Strikes" provision. Weaver contends that the 
government's February 10, 2000 notice of its intent to seek 
a sentence of life imprisonment under this statutory 
provision was defective because it failed to properly inform 
him of the nature of the prior convictions relied upon, and 
thus provided him inadequate notice. The sufficiency of 
such notice is a question of law that we review de novo. 
United States v. King, 127 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 
Notice of intent to seek life imprisonment under the 
provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1) requires notice under 21 
U.S.C. S 851, which states: 
 
       (a)(1) No person who stands convicted of an offense 
       under this part shall be sentenced to increased 
       punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, 
       unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
tellers could recall to whom she gave the written description. App. at 
486-88, 525-26, 560-61. Teller Landon testified that she did not recall if 
she had given her written description form to law enforcement personnel, 
stating that "[p]erhaps they took it, I don't remember who got the form." 
Agent Curtis and Officer Emrick both testified that they did not see any 
written statements by the tellers, App. at 535-36, 691, 698, and neither 
the Erie Police Department nor the bank had any written descriptions of 
the robber by the tellers, App. at 567, 683, 868. 
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       the United States attorney files an information with the 
       court (and serves a copy of such information on the 
       person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the 
       previous convictions to be relied upon. . . . Clerical 
       mistakes in the information may be amended at any 
       time prior to the pronouncement of sentence. 
 
       (c)(1) If the person denies any allegation of the 
       information of prior conviction, or claims that any 
       conviction alleged is invalid, he shall file a written 
       response to the information. . . . The failure of the 
       United States attorney to include in the information 
       the complete criminal record of the person or any facts 
       in addition to the convictions to be relied upon shall 
       not constitute grounds for invalidating the notice given 
       in the information required by subsection (a)(1) of this 
       section. 
 
21 U.S.C. S 851. The requirements set out inS 851 are 
mandatory and a district court may not impose an 
enhanced sentence unless the defendant has been notified 
of the "strikes" in compliance with these provisions. United 
States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1983). The 
government gave notice to Weaver of its intent to rely upon 
three prior convictions: a "July 3, 1975 conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter," a "November 21, 1977 
conviction for armed robbery," and a "June 19, 1989 
conviction for armed robbery." It later amended the notice 
in certain respects, as we will discuss below. Weaver 
contends that the government's notice was flawed in three 
ways. 
 
First, one of the previous convictions set forth in the 
notice sent to Weaver contained an error, in that it 
indicated that his July 3, 1975 conviction was for 
"involuntary manslaughter," when it was actually for 
"voluntary manslaughter." Second, the original notice sent 
to Weaver indicated that one of the prior convictions that 
the government would rely upon was his November 21, 
1977 conviction for armed robbery. In fact, there was no 
crime in Pennsylvania entitled "armed robbery" in 1977. 
Rather, on November 21, 1977, Weaver was found guilty of 
two separate robberies that were consolidated for trial and, 
with respect to one of the two robbery convictions, the jury 
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also convicted Weaver of using a "prohibited offensive 
weapon." 
 
Finally, the reference to Weaver's third conviction 
improperly referred to an armed robbery conviction on 
June 19, 1989. Weaver was originally convicted on June 19, 
1989, but the conviction was not for armed robbery. 
Instead, Weaver had been convicted of two separate charges 
of robbery and criminal conspiracy relating to the robbery 
of two banks on the same day, and both convictions were 
later vacated and re-entered on July 2, 1997. 
 
We have not had occasion to specifically address the 
sufficiency of notice under S 851. However, we are guided 
by rulings of our sister courts of appeals in assessing the 
adequacy of a S 851 information. While continually 
emphasizing the need for strict compliance with 
S 851(a)(1)'s filing and service requirements, e.g., Harris v. 
United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998) 
("[E]ven where a defendant receives actual notice that the 
government intends to rely on a previous conviction to 
enhance his sentence, the district court lacks jurisdiction 
to impose an enhanced sentence until the government files 
an information as required under S 851."), those courts 
requiring strict compliance have drawn a distinction 
between the strict procedural requirements regarding the 
giving of notice, such as service and filing, which are 
explicit in the statute, and the precise information that 
must be included in an information, which the statute does 
not specify. Courts have often found that the statute 
permits more flexibility with respect to the latter. E.g., 
United States v. Hamilton, 208 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 
2000) (finding that though the Ninth Circuit requires strict 
compliance with "the procedural aspects of section 851(b), 
. . . an apparent typographical mistake in a section 851(a) 
sentencing information that otherwise satisfies due process 
notice requirements does not render the information 
invalid."); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 371, 376 (7th 
Cir. 2000) ("The statute itself . . . does not specify the form 
the filing must take, and we have . . . been flexible with 
regard to what the government must do in order to comply 
with section 851."). 
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Rather than focusing on exactly what information the 
government must provide in a S 851(a)(1) information, 
courts have instead analyzed whether the purpose of 
S 851(a)(1) -- providing a defendant with sufficient notice to 
comply with due process -- has been satisfied. Accordingly, 
"[o]ur inquiry must be whether the information which was 
filed provided [the defendant] reasonable notice of the 
government's intent to rely on a particular conviction and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard," Perez v. United States, 
249 F.3d 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001), and we must be 
careful not to "elevat[e] form over substance" in doing so. 
King, 127 F.3d at 489. Hence, the question is whether any 
of the government's errors rendered the notice 
constitutionally lacking. United States v. Steen , 55 F.3d 
1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A] district court may enhance 
a defendant's sentence, as long as the government provides 
constitutionally sufficient notice of the previous convictions 
through an information filed prior to trial."). We note, also, 
that S 851(a)(1) specifically provides that"[c]lerical mistakes 
in the information may be amended at any time prior to the 
pronouncement of sentence." We will address each of the 
claimed errors. 
 
(a) Voluntary Manslaughter 
 
Weaver contends that the notice wrongly indicated he 
had been previously convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 
More than two weeks before sentencing, the government 
filed an amended notice, correcting the error by listing 
Weaver's July 3, 1975 conviction as being for voluntary 
manslaughter. The District Court determined that this error 
was a clerical mistake that could be amended pursuant to 
the plain language of the statute. 
 
We agree with the District Court that the government's 
error in listing Weaver's past crime as being for 
"involuntary manslaughter," when it was actually for 
"voluntary manslaughter," was a clerical mistake and 
therefore capable of being corrected by amendment under 
S 851(a)(1). See King, 127 F.3d at 489 (determining that 
incorrect date of prior conviction included in information is 
clerical mistake as referenced in S 851(a)(1)). Although 
Section 851 does not define "clerical error," we conclude 
that the weight of authority discussing clerical errors in 
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other contexts indicates that the government's error 
qualifies as such. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) ("Clerical 
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected . . . ."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 ("Clerical mistakes 
in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
in the record arising from oversight or omission  may be 
corrected . . . .") (emphasis added); see also American 
Trucking Ass'ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S. 133, 145 
(1958) ("It is axiomatic that courts have the power and the 
duty to correct judgments which contain clerical errors or 
judgments which have issued due to inadvertence or 
mistake."); Jones v. Anderson-Tully Co., 722 F.2d 211, 212 
(5th Cir. 1984) (holding that clerical errors "must be in the 
nature of recitation" and "not errors of substantive 
judgment"). Because the government's amended 
information complied with S 851(a)(1)'s requirements for the 
amendment of clerical errors, we affirm the District Court's 
holding that the government listing Weaver's offense as 
"involuntary manslaughter" instead of "voluntary 
manslaughter" did not render the S 851 notice inadequate. 
 
(b) November 21, 1977 Conviction for Armed Robbery 
 
With regard to the listing of Weaver's November 21, 1977 
conviction as being for armed robbery, the District Court 
correctly noted that Pennsylvania did not have an offense 
titled "armed robbery" in 1977. Weaver was actually 
convicted of two counts of robbery, one of which involved a 
"prohibited offensive weapon." 
 
First, Weaver argues that because the government's 
original notice stated that it was relying on a conviction on 
November 21, 1977 (singular), instead of on two convictions 
(plural), the notice did not comply with S 851(a)(1). 
However, the government did in fact correct this error in 
the amended notice, changing a single conviction for armed 
robbery on November 21, 1977 to a "November 21, 1977 
conviction for robbery" and a "November 21, 1977 
conviction for armed robbery." App. at 948. We agree with 
the District Court that this mistake can be classified as 
clerical, and due to the fact that the amended notice 
accurately reflected that the government was relying on two 
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robbery convictions, rather than one, Weaver's argument is 
unpersuasive. 
 
Weaver's second contention is that he was prejudiced by 
the incorrect notice17 because he could not identify upon 
which of the two 1977 robbery convictions the government 
was relying. He bases this argument on the fact that under 
S 3559(c)(3), a robbery conviction can not constitute one of 
his "strikes" for sentencing purposes if a defendant 
"establishes by clear and convincing evidence that (i) no 
firearm or other dangerous weapon was used in the offense 
and no threat of use of a firearm or other dangerous 
weapon was involved in the offense; and (ii) the offense did 
not result in death or serious bodily injury . . . to any 
person." He asserts that if the government had given him 
proper notice, he could have attempted to prove that an 
offensive weapon was not used in one of the robberies. 
 
We are not swayed by Weaver's argument. We have 
already stated that the amended notice clarified that the 
government was relying upon both convictions entered on 
November 21, 1977. And though the amended notice still 
listed "armed robbery," instead of robbery and use of 
prohibited weapon, as a relied-upon conviction, given that 
the government listed the correct date on the amended 
notice and attached copies of his certified convictions, we 
cannot see how Weaver's supposed confusion renders the 
notice insufficient. Weaver was alerted to the convictions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We agree with Weaver that a S 851(a) violation is not subject to 
harmless error analysis. See United States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 852 
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding that if government fails to provide notice, it 
cannot seek enhancement; there is no room to argue that error was 
harmless). But that is not the aim of our prejudice inquiry. Rather, as 
discussed earlier, we are asking whether Weaver was prejudiced in order 
to determine whether he was given adequate notice, as required by due 
process, of the previous convictions upon which the government would 
rely. See Steen, 55 F.3d at 1027 (emphasis added) ("[A] district court 
may enhance a defendant's sentence, as long as the government provides 
constitutionally sufficient notice of the previous convictions through an 
information filed prior to trial."); United States v. Belanger, 970 F.2d 
416, 
419 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Section 851 does not specify the particular form 
which notice of enhancement must take and the government's filings 
provided Belanger reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard."). 
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the government would rely on as strikes, and he had the 
ability to challenge the use of both robbery convictions. He 
could have argued that a weapon was not used in one of 
his robberies, thereby attempting to avail himself of 
S 3559(c)(3)'s exception. He did not do so, and we do not 
believe that technical errors such as the ones here give him 
the opportunity to revisit the issue on remand. 
 
In addition, prior to his trial, Weaver filed two in limine 
motions to exclude his prior convictions for bank robbery, 
armed robbery and manslaughter. Hence, the pretrial 
proceedings clearly indicate that he was well aware of the 
prior convictions that the government was relying upon, 
further weakening his claim that he lacked sufficient 
information to put him on notice. See United States v. 
Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2000) (considering 
actual notice as indicative of constitutionally adequate 
notice in context of different statute). 
 
Some element of confusion or lack of specificity has not 
rendered notices deficient in previous cases. E.g., United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1485 (10th Cir. 
1994) (upholding information with no prior case number, 
date or specific place of conviction); United States v. 
Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding 
enhancement despite error in statutory section of previous 
conviction). Thus, we hold that the government's 
information regarding Weaver's November 21, 1977 
conviction was sufficient to "signal[ ] the government's 
intention to rely upon a particular prior conviction." 
Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1486. 
 
(c) 1989 Armed Robbery Conviction 
 
Finally, Weaver contends that because his convictions for 
armed robbery and criminal conspiracy on June 19, 1989 
were later vacated, the government listed nullified 
convictions. However, the convictions were vacated July 2, 
1997 and were re-entered, after a guilty plea, under the 
same criminal docket number on July 2, 1997. Hence, the 
only error is listing the wrong date of conviction. We 
classify this as nothing more than a clerical mistake that, 
like the other errors we have addressed, was corrected in 
the amended notice. Thus, we apply the same reasoning, 
and find that this mistake does not entitle Weaver to relief. 
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Weaver also argues that the notice was inadequate 
because he was not convicted of armed robbery on that 
date, but rather of two separate charges -- robbery and 
criminal conspiracy -- relating to the robbery of two banks 
on the same day. Here, our analysis is the same as it was 
with the second mistake regarding the armed robbery 
convictions, that is, we are persuaded that the 
government's information was sufficient to "signal[ ] the 
government's intention to rely upon a particular prior 
conviction." Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d at 1486. Thus, we 
find that Weaver received adequate notice that the 
government would rely on his July 2, 1997 robbery 
conviction. 
 
Therefore, we find that the notice was sufficiently 
complete to provide Weaver with satisfactory notice under 
the statute, and that the District Court was correct in not 
permitting Weaver, in effect, to take advantage of technical 
or clerical errors in the notice provided. Therefore, we hold 
that the District Court did not err in finding Weaver 
received adequate notice as per 18 U.S.C. S 851. 
 
3. Increasing Sentence Based on Prior Convictions Not 
       Charged in Indictment nor Proven to the Jury 
       Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
 
Weaver contends that the failure to include his prior 
convictions for serious violent felonies in the indictment 
and to charge the jury that it must find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Weaver committed those prior 
offenses violated his right to due process or trial by jury. 
Our review of this issue is plenary. Mack, 229 F.3d at 231 
("This Court reviews de novo Mack's assertion that his due 
process rights were violated."). 
 
In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 
(1998), the Supreme Court addressed this precise issue. 
There, the Court decided that no due process violation 
occurs when prior convictions are used to increase a 
statutory maximum without being charged in an indictment 
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 239- 
41. Recently, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), the Court upheld the validity of Almendarez-Torres, 
singling out "the fact of a prior conviction" as the exception 
 
                                27 
  
to the rule that "any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. at 490. 
 
Despite speculation about the future of Almendarez- 
Torres,18 we heed the words of the Supreme Court in 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. , 490 
U.S. 477, 484 (1989): "If a precedent of this Court has 
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons 
rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of 
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, 
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions." Nor do we find, as Weaver argues, that the 
"Three Strikes" requirement of a mandatory minimum 
sentence is distinguishable, for due process purposes, from 
the increased permissive maximum penalty discussed in 
Almendarez-Torres. Both have the effect of increasing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. We note Chief Judge Becker's concurrence in Mack, which 
highlighted the shaky ground on which Almendarez-Torres stands: 
 
       [T]he Apprendi majority went out of its way to cast the future 
       viability of Almendarez-Torres into question. See id. at 2362 
("Even 
       though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres  was incorrectly 
       decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today 
should 
       apply if the recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not 
       contest the decision's validity and we need not revisit it for 
purposes 
       of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to 
the 
       general rule we recalled at the outset."). Moreover, as 
commentators 
       have noted, five sitting Justices are now on record as saying that 
       Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided. See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 
       2379 (Thomas, J., concurring); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248, 
       118 S.Ct. 1219 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg, 
       dissenting). I do not suggest that we should predict that the Court 
       will overturn Almendarez-Torres. Cf. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 
       3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed. 2d 199 (1997) ("Despite what Chief 
       Judge Posner aptly described as Albrecht's `infirmities, [and] its 
       increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,' there remains the 
       question whether Albrecht deserves continuing respect under the 
       doctrine of stare decisis. The Court of Appeals was correct in 
       applying that principle despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it 
is 
       this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.") 
       (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But the apprehension remains. 
 
Mack, 229 F.3d at 239 n.5. 
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sentence, based on findings not charged or made by the 
jury, beyond what would otherwise be the statutory 
maximum. Therefore, we find that the District Court 
properly rejected Weaver's claim that the failure to include 
his prior convictions for serious violent felonies in the 
indictment, and to charge the jury that it must find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Weaver committed those prior 
offenses, violated his right to due process or trial by jury. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the District 
Court's Judgment and Conviction Order. 
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